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Williams v. Benjamin and Violence Against Prisoners by Their
Jailers: What Are the Limits of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment?
An inmate, securely separated from his jailers by the iron bars of
his cell, throws water through the bars to protest an argument be-
tween a fellow inmate and the guards Suddenly, the guards mace
him, and although he screams and pleads, his jailers refuse to allow
him to wash off the mace.2 The guards then enter his cell, rip his mat-
tress from the metal frame, and chain him to the frame spread-
eagled.3 Although he cries and begs for medical attention, he is left
in that position for eight hours, while the mace burns his face, eyes,
and upper torso.4 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit re-
cently confronted these facts in Williams v. Benjamin,' and its
decision may leave doubts as to the degree of constitutional protec-
tion enjoyed by prisoners.6
Although the Supreme Court largely avoided the area of prison-
ers' rights under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause until the
1960s,7 the Eighth Amendment has long protected prisoners against
1. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756,759 (4th Cir. 1996).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 760.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 759-60.
6. Although the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of whether
the prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights were violated, the court largely deferred to the
discretion of South Carolina prison officials. See infra notes 28-41, 151-201 and accompa-
nying text.
7. See Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoner's Rights, FED. PROBATION,
Mar. 1995, at 36, 36. Commentators have asserted that this "hands-off" approach re-
sulted from the view that prisoners were slaves of the state and lost virtually all of their
rights upon conviction. See id. (citing Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 1024,
1026-27 (1871)); see also Kenneth C. Haas, Judicial Politics and Correctional Reform: An
Analysis of the Decline of the "Hands-Off' Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795, 796
("[M]any courts routinely and blithely recited the hands-off approach even when prison-
ers complained of unusually shocking and harsh conditions and needlessly cruel
punishments."). Courts eventually discarded this approach, finding that while prisoners
retained their constitutional rights, the courts' role was not to intervene to protect them;
rather, this was a responsibility of the legislative and executive branches. See Call, supra,
at 36. In the early 1960s, the courts became more active, partly because prisoners were
more aggressive in demanding that their rights be honored and more public interest at-
torneys were willing to argue their cases. See id.; see also Lance D. Cassak, Hearing the
Cries of Prisoners: The Third Circuit's Treatment of Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 19
SETON HALL L. REV. 526,531-34 (1989) (documenting "The Rise and Fall of the 'Hands-
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barbaric forms of punishment that would shock the public.8 Notions
of what constitutes "cruel and unusual punishment" have evolved
over the years from complaints about the rack and various other tor-
ture devices to include modem complaints that prisons are not
providing inmates with adequate facilities and food.9 Although many
believe that prisoners deserve whatever punishments prison officials
may prescribe,"0 courts have the job of drawing the line between the
legitimate retributional goals of the prison system and the outright
torture of inmates at the hands of their jailers. While prison officials
are accorded a large measure of discretion in responding to distur-
bances and unruly inmates, courts cannot defer entirely to these
officials' actions.1 In Williams, the United States Court of Appeals
Off' Doctrine" and the recognition by courts of inmates' rights in the 1960s).
8. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (stating that the purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is to protect prisoners from barbaric forms of punishment); Wilk-
erson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878) (noting that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
"torture" and "unnecessary cruelty"). The Eighth Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment was later incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law.").
9. See Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,592 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding prison officials did
not violate the Eighth Amendment by allowing an inch or two of standing water to remain
in inmates' shower), cert. denied, No. 96-7058, 1996 WL 744913 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997); Ab-
dul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding it was not cruel and
unusual punishment to prescribe an analgesic and anti-inflammatory agent instead of
ibuprofen for a shoulder injury); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574, 1580 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that serving prisoners poorly-prepared, cold food did not violate the Eighth
Amendment).
10. See, e.g., Pat Flynn, Chain Gangs: Alabama Brought it Back. Now California
Considers Adopting the Old Prison Practice Some Think is Just and Some Consider Hu-
miliating, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 25, 1996, at Al (discussing public view that
prisoners should be sentenced to hard labor, rather than sitting around in luxury); Laura
LaFay, Crime: Perception Doesn't Meet Reality, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Oct.
13, 1996, at Al (discussing America's crime problem and public support for "three strikes,
you're out" legislation). But cf. Joe Rogers, Sentencing Laws Should Apply to All,
TENNESSEAN (Nashville), Apr. 17, 1996, at 1B (stating that, in the interest of fairness, the
benefit of a sentencing overhaul in the state which reduced sentences for many crimes
should be extended to previously convicted inmates via eligibility for parole).
11. See, e.g., Cortes-Quinones v. Jimenez-Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 560 (1st Cir. 1988)
(finding that a jury could have found that prison officials showed deliberate indifference
to overcrowded conditions that led to a prisoner's death); Morgan v. District of Columbia,
824 F.2d 1049, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming that prison officials violated inmate's
Eighth Amendment rights by showing deliberate indifference to inmate's security from
attack by a fellow inmate); Patterson v. Mintzes, 717 F.2d 284, 289 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding
that prisoners' lack of opportunity to exercise may have violated Eighth Amendment and
that summary judgment was improper); Kirby v. Blackledge, 530 F.2d 583, 587 (4th Cir.
1976) (holding that unsanitary prison conditions had the cumulative effect of being cruel
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for the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina prison officials may
have violated a prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights, thus forcing a
lower court to examine the methods of discipline used by one of
South Carolina's prisons. 2
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the actions of South
Carolina prison officials who maced a prisoner, chained him to a bare
mattress frame, and did not allow him to wash off the mace or receive
medical attention for eight hours created an " 'inference of wanton-
ness in the infliction of pain,'" thus potentially violating the Eighth
Amendment.'3 In so holding, the court followed well established
precedent of the United States Supreme Court and other federal
courts of appeals.'4 This Note first discusses the facts of Williams,
and the rulings of the lower court and the Fourth Circuit. 5 After
tracing the historical development of Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence in the context of prison conditions and
excessive force claims, 6 the Note analyzes Williams by comparing it
to cases in this line of precedent." Finally, the Note considers possi-
ble future implications of Williams and alternative methods of
analysis that were available to the Fourth Circuit.
Appellant Sylvester Williams was an inmate at Lieber Correc-
tional Institution in Ridgeville, South Carolina. 9 While in the
prison's administrative segregation unit, Williams and other inmates
overheard a guard threaten to mace a fellow prisoner and protested
this by throwing water out of their food service windows.2 In re-
and unusual punishment); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 524 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding
that prisoner was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment if he could prove he was
placed in administrative segregation with no clothing and exposed to subfreezing tem-
peratures in filthy conditions).
12. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 770.
13. Id. at 768 (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986)). The Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants. See id. at
770. Because this was a motion for summary judgment, the Fourth Circuit found
"wantonness" by viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. at
768.
14. See id. at 761-68.
15. See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 46-148 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 149-96 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 197-224 and accompanying text.
19. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 759.
20. See id. Prison officials contended that the prisoners were "throwing cups of uni-
dentified foul-smelling liquids" at the guards. Id. at 760. However, the court
acknowledged that in considering whether summary judgment was appropriate for the
defendants, the court had to accept Williams's allegations as true-that he was throwing
water at the guards. See id. at 762.
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sponse, prison guards maced Williams in the face and chest.21 Al-
though Williams screamed in pain and begged for a shower, the
guards refused his pleas and ten minutes later removed Williams's
mattress from his bed and placed him in four-point restraints on the
bedframe." Williams was confined in this position for eight hours
and was not permitted to wash off the mace or use the toilet. He
also was not checked by medical personnel, although he was immobi-
lized and inhaled mace fumes during this eight hour period.24 In a pro
se complaint, Williams alleged that the guards violated his right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amend-
ment and his right not to be deprived of liberty without due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.' The defendants denied violat-
ing any of Williams's constitutional rights, and a magistrate judge
recommended that the district court grant the defendants' motion for
summary judgment.2 The district court adopted the magistrate's re-
port and granted the defendants' motion.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling that Williams had not
been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, but re-
versed and remanded the district court's order granting summary
21. See id. at 759. Other inmates involved in the disruption were also maced. See id.
A dose of mace or pepper spray immediately causes coughing and gagging, and often the
target's eyes swell shut instantly. See Sheridan Chaney, Youths Learning That Pepper
Spray and Play Don't Mix Authorities Say, CHI. TRIB. (McHenry County), Sept. 8, 1995,
at 4. Controversy has surrounded the use of mace and pepper spray by law enforcement
officials. For instance, one newspaper reported that police use of these chemicals has
been associated with dozens of deaths in the United States and Canada in the past five
years. See Bentley Orrick, Cloud Hangs Over Cop Sprays: Critics Say Someone Will
Likely Die if Police Don't Switch to a Less Potent Formula, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 10, 1996,
at 1. Furthermore, specialists have estimated that, nationwide, there have been 40 deaths
due to pepper spray, but no coroner has ever named the spray as the cause of death. See
Matt Bai, Man Dies After Police Subdue Him, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 17,1995, at 58,58.
22. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 760. Placing Williams in four-point restraints meant that
he was secured in a "spread-eagled" position on the bedframe, with handcuffs attached to
his wrists and shackles attached to his ankles, thus completely immobilizing him. Id.
23. See id.
24. See id. Williams asserted that he felt as if he were on fire from the fumes, and
that he suffered intensely from the burning of his face and eyes. See id. The defendant
prison officials asserted that they monitored Williams during his confinement in accor-
dance with South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") Policy 1500.12
[hereinafter the SCDC Policy], which governs the use of restraints and the monitoring of
inmates. See id. at 760, 766.
25. See id. at 760.
26. See id. The magistrate judge found that the evidence did not support Williams's
excessive force claim, and that even if Williams established that the restraints were used
in violation of the SCDC policy, supra note 24, the complaint did not state a due process
claim. See id. at 760-61.
27. See id. at 761.
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judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim.2 The court reviewed
Supreme Court precedent,2 which it explained had established a two-
fold analysis: a court must inquire whether prison officers acted with
a "sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective component) and
whether the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted on the inmate was
sufficiently serious (objective component)."' Under this rule, when
an inmate claims prison officials used excessive force, to satisfy the
subjective component, the inmate must demonstrate that the officer
acted "'maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.' ,.. This standard is assessed by balancing factors relating to
the amount of force used, the need for the force, and the threat that
officials reasonably perceived.32 Although this subjective component
sets a high standard, it is counteracted by a lower objective standard,
requiring only proof of more than de minimis pain or injury?3
The court divided Williams's case into three distinct parts, sepa-
rately addressing the initial use of mace, the four-point restraints, and
the length of the restraint without medical attention.' First, the court
held that the initial use of mace did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.35 Second, after conceding that the use of four-point re-
straints can be dangerous, the court noted that their use is common if
mace is ineffective in controlling inmates; thus, the court held that
their use in this case did not violate the Eighth Amendment." The
third part of the court's opinion analyzed whether prison officials
28. See id. at 770.
29. See id. at 761-62.
30. Id at 761.
31. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)). This is a
higher standard than the deliberate indifference standard used for inadequate medical
care and conditions of confinement claims. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
32. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 762; see also Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 (1992)
(using the balancing test and determining that the absence of serious injury is not fatal to
an Eighth Amendment claim); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 326 (1986) (finding
that prison officials did not act maliciously and sadistically by shooting a prisoner during a
riot).
33. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. The Williams court did not address the objective
element, because the defendants only directed their arguments at the subjective element.
See id. at 762.
34. See id. at 762-64.
35. See id. at 763. The court concluded that the use of mace is not per se unconstitu-
tional, and that precedent allowed mace to be used to control recalcitrant inmates. See
id.; see also Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 138-39 (4th Cir. 1966) (finding that the
prison's use of tear gas 12 to 15 times each year was not cruel and unusual). The Land-
man court did, however, recommend to state officials that close scrutiny of prison
personnel's actions was both necessary and desirable. See id. at 141.
36. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 764.
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violated the Eighth Amendment by leaving Williams unattended for
eight hours without medical attention and without allowing him to
wash off the mace.37 The court observed that the only "need" for
force was to control the initial throwing of the water; the record did
not reflect that prison officials felt any additional "threat" from Wil-
liams." The court rejected the defendants' reliance on a South
Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") policy governing re-
straint of prisoners, finding that the issue of whether the guards
complied with the policy was "hotly disputed." Finally, although the
defendants argued that their decision to leave Williams in this state
was a constitutional exercise of discretion, the court noted that
"[d]eference to prison officials does not give them constitutional li-
cense to torture inmates."" The court also noted that the defendants
did not adequately support their position with precedent regarding
the restraint of prisoners.
The court then turned to Williams's due process claim. Al-
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Id. at 765-66. The policy stated:
"Four-point restraints will be used only as a last resort to prevent harm or physi-
cal danger to him/herself or others, and then only upon the order/approval of a
physician. Under no circumstances will such restraints be applied to enhance se-
curity of the facility, prevent escape from the facility, or for punishment."
Id. at 766 (quoting the SCDC Policy, supra note 24 (alteration in original)). The SCDC
Policy also required that prison officials monitor constrained inmates constantly and ree-
valuate the need for restraint every 15 minutes. See id.
40. Id. at 765. Although the court acknowledged that deference should be given to
prison officials, it noted that "the unnecessary infliction of continued pain ... clearly sup-
ports an inference that the guards were acting to punish, rather than to quell the
disturbance." Id.
41. See id. at 767. In support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants
relied on cases with extensive factual records detailing why particular inmates needed to
be restrained or maced; by contrast, the district court in Williams had developed no fac-
tual record regarding Williams's disciplinary history. See id at 767-68; see also LeMaire v.
Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that the prisoner's "meticulously
documented behavior" and the lower court's extensive findings of fact made a judgment
for the prison proper); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574-76 (11th Cir. 1991)
(holding that restraint of a prisoner for over 28 hours, with gauze placed over the pris-
oner's mouth, was not cruel and unusual punishment due to the prisoner's well-
documented violent past in the prison); Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir.
1988) (finding that strict prison regulations were warranted by detailed findings of fact
regarding extremely violent prison conditions). Furthermore, in the cases cited by the
defendants, it was necessary to the holdings that prison officials had complied with prison
regulations when using four-point restraints. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 767. Therefore, by
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court concluded that there
was " 'a reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain,'" rendering the district
court's granting of summary judgment improper. Id. at 768 (quoting Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312,322 (1986)).
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though the court found his claim unclear, it assumed that Williams
intended to allege a violation of both his substantive and procedural
due process rights.42 The court cursorily dismissed the substantive
claim, relying on precedent establishing that the Eighth Amendment
is the primary source of substantive protection for convicted prison-
ers, and that the Fourteenth Amendment gives prisoners no greater
protection.43 Although the court acknowledged Williams's forceful
arguments that prison officials violated his procedural due process
rights, the court ultimately found no violation because Williams did
not specify what types of procedural protections were required in this
situation." Thus, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did
not err in granting summary judgment for the defendants on Wil-
liams's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. 45
Eighth Amendment claims based on the punishment of state and
federal prisoners have been common;" however, until recently, the
Supreme Court has demonstrated a reluctance to examine prison
conditions and mistreatment of prisoners.47 Historically, the courts
42. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 768.
43. See id. (citing Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327); accord Burton, 943 F.2d at 1576.
44. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 769-70. The court found that pre-deprivation protections
were not available because of the "emergency situation" of a prison disturbance, and that
Williams did not allege that his post-deprivation remedies were inadequate. Id. at 770.
45. See id. Judge Hamilton concurred in the judgment and stated that the district
court should examine additional issues on remand. See id. (Hamilton, J., concurring). In
listing these issues, his concurrence gives the defendants new arguments to explore upon
remand. See id. (Hamilton, J., concurring). First, Judge Hamilton advised the district
court to examine carefully the objective component of Williams's claim, which was not
the subject of this appeal. See id. (Hamilton, J., concurring). Although Judge Hamilton
acknowledged that the objective factor was not properly before the court, he still con-
cluded that "the record is crystal clear that Williams suffered no injury from the
defendants' actions." Id. (Hamilton, J., concurring). He reiterated that although the
defendants had not raised this claim on appeal, nothing would preclude them from raising
it upon remand. See id. at 771 (Hamilton, J., concurring). However, he was careful to
state that the absence of a factual record made the issue impossible to resolve at this
point. See id. at 770 (Hamilton, J., concurring). Judge Hamilton also briefly discussed the
fact that the defendants may be entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. See id. at
771 (Hamilton, J., concurring). Although he acknowledged that the defendants did not
raise this defense at trial, he advised the district court that it may consider the issue
"should it arise." Id. (Hamilton, J., concurring). Thus, one may reasonably conclude that,
upon remand, the issue will arise.
46. See, e.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 565-82 (10th Cir. 1980); Pugh v. Locke,
406 F. Supp. 318, 321-32 (M.D. Ala. 1976), affjd sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d
283 (5th Cir. 1977); Inmates of the Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676,
684-90 (D. Mass. 1973), affid, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974); Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp.
881,893-96 (N.D. Miss. 1972), affid, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981), marked the Supreme Court's first major
consideration of an Eighth Amendment claim for unfit prison conditions. See infra notes
68-77 (discussing Rhodes). In Rhodes, the Court began the trend of limiting the role that
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followed a "hands off" doctrine with prisons, making it difficult for
prisoners to obtain relief from barbaric prison conditions and vio-
lence at the hands of prison officials.' However, in the late 1960s,
federal courts began to take note of the harsh conditions in the na-
tion's prisons and to make a concerted effort to guarantee that
prisoners were afforded their constitutional rights. 9
In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,0 the Court considered a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. In Francis, a Louisiana state penitentiary prisoner was
sentenced to death by electrocution.5' When prison officials placed
him in the chair, however, the current was not strong enough to kill
him, so the state issued a new death warrant for a second electrocu-
tion.52 The petitioner attempted to prevent the execution of the
death warrant by invoking the protection of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.53
courts play in overseeing the operation of prisons. See Melvin Gutterman, The Contours
of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REv.
373,382 (1995) (stating that Rhodes "advanced a relatively narrow principle").
48. See Gutterman, supra note 47, at 374. Courts adhered to the rationale that pris-
oners were slaves of the states. See id. ("They are the slaves of the State undergoing
punishment for heinous crimes committed against the laws of the land." (citing Ruffin v.
Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 1024, 1026-27 (1871))). Thus, courts avoided hearing
these cases by declining jurisdiction in prison conditions cases. See Michael S. Feldberg,
Comment, Confronting the Conditions of Confinement An Expanded Role for Courts in
Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 367,367 n.1 (1977).
49. See Gutterman, supra note 47, at 374-75. Courts' treatment of prisoner cases
drastically changed in the 1960s. See Feldberg, supra note 48, at 367 n.1. Since then,
many courts have actively reviewed prison conditions, examining the details of prison life
and mandating wide-sweeping reform. See id. at 370. However, at least one commentator
feels that the Supreme Court "has continually failed to honor all but the most basic of
human needs," and that the lower federal courts have been the driving force behind
prison reform. Melvin Gutterman, Prison Objectives and Human Dignity: Reaching a
Mutual Accommodation, 1992 BYU L. REV. 857, 858. Aside from increased judicial at-
tention to appalling prison conditions, newspapers, news shows, and magazines began in
the 1960s to focus on prisons, thus alerting the public to a national problem. See Gutter-
man, supra note 47, at 374.
50. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
51. See id. at 460.
52. See id. at 460-61.
53. See id. at 461. The petitioner also invoked the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause and argued that the execution would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. See id. Many of the rights in the first eight amendments have
been held to apply to state action and thus have been incorporated into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-49
(1968) (surveying the rights previously incorporated into the Due Process Clause and
incorporating the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases). A century ago,
the Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment did not apply to state action. See O'Neil
1997] 1417
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The Supreme Court held that the treatment of the petitioner did
not qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.' The Court observed
that the Eighth Amendment entitles a prisoner to a "[p]rohibition
against the wanton infliction of pain."5 However, the Court rea-
soned that the circumstances here were an unfortunate accident, and
that there was no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain on the pris-
oner. 6 Therefore, the Court concluded that the hardship imposed
upon the petitioner did not rise "to that level of hardship denounced
as denial of due process because of cruelty."'57
Thirty years later, in Estelle v. Gamble,58 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed for the first time an Eighth Amendment challenge to a
condition suffered during imprisonment rather than a punishment
that was part of the sentence. 9 In Estelle, a prisoner in Texas brought
a civil rights action complaining about the medical treatment he re-
ceived after injuring his back on a prison work assignment. The
v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 332 (1892). However, in Francis, the Court assumed that it
applied to the states, see Francis, 329 U.S. at 462, and in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962), the Court explicitly found that the Fourteenth Amendment incorpo-
rated the Eighth Amendment.
54. See Francis, 329 U.S. at 463.
55. Id. The Court noted that this prohibition originated in the English Bill of Rights
of 1688, and that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits execution performed by a state
"in a cruel manner." Id.
56. See id. at 464. Francis is typical of many cases decided before courts began to
thoroughly investigate prison conditions. See Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771 (10th
Cir. 1954) ("Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere
with the ordinary prison rules or regulations."); cf. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381
(E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971) ("For the ordinary convict a sentence
to the Arkansas Penitentiary today amounts to a banishment from civilized society to a
dark and evil world completely alien to the free world .... ).
57. Francis, 329 U.S at 464; cf. Steven H. Jupiter, Constitution Notwithstanding: The
Political Illegitimacy of the Death Penalty in American Democracy, 23 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 437, 441-42 (1996) (arguing "that the death penalty is inconsistent with underlying
principles of American democracy and is thus illegitimate ... despite its conceded consti-
tutionality"). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence
and its relation to death penalty cases, see generally David Heffernan, Comment, Amer-
ica The Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the Eighth Amendment Under International
Law, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 481,502-14 (1996).
58. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
59. See id. at 98.
60. See id. The prisoner sustained an injury when a bale of cotton fell upon him. See
id. at 99. He went to the prison hospital time after time, where a prison doctor gave him
pain killers and allowed him to remain in his cell for several days. See id. The doctor
eventually pronounced him fit to return to work, even though he complained that his back
hurt just as much as it had on the day of the injury. See id. at 100. After refusing to work,
the prisoner was placed in an administrative segregation unit, where he began to complain
of migraines, chest pain, and blackouts. See id. at 100-01. His requests to visit the prison
doctor were initially refused, until he was eventually hospitalized and treated for irregular
cardiac rhythm. See id. at 101.
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essence of the prisoner's claim was that prison officials subjected him
to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amend-
ment by failing to provide him with adequate medical care.61 The
Court reasoned that the Framers' intent in drafting the Eighth
Amendment was to proscribe torture and other barbaric methods of
punishment. 2 However, the Court had refined the standard for
Eighth Amendment violations to a prohibition of those actions
"incompatible with 'the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.' ,63 Additionally, the Court recog-
nized that actions might violate the Eighth Amendment when they
"'involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' "'
The Court then discussed inmates' reliance on prison officials to
treat their medical needs and stated ,that prison officials violate the
Eighth Amendment when they show "deliberate indifference" to
those needs." Thus, only "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs" would rise
to the level of a constitutional violation.66 Under this standard, the
challenge in Estelle still would have failed because the Court found
that the prison doctor's actions were the equivalent of negligence,
which did not satisfy the deliberate indifference standard. 7
In 1981, the Supreme Court again addressed a prisoner's Eighth
Amendment claim in Rhodes v. Chapman,8 marking the first time the
Court interpreted the Eighth Amendment to protect inmates from
certain conditions of confinement. 9 Rhodes involved a class action
suit by inmates in an Ohio state prison who alleged a violation of
their civil rights due to the practice of keeping two inmates in each
61. See id.
62. See id. at 102.
63. Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
64. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
65. Id. at 103-04. The Court was careful to distinguish cases such as Francis from this
category, stating that an accident cannot be characterized as a wanton and unnecessary
infliction of pain. See id. at 105.
66. Id. at 106.
67. See id. at 107. The Estelle dissent criticized the majority's focus on the subjective
motivation of the prison guards, as well as the emphasis on deliberate indifference. See
id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stating that the majority "improperly attache[d] sig-
nificance to the subjective motivation of the defendant as a criterion for determining
whether cruel and unusual punishment has been inflicted," the dissent concluded that the
determination of an Eighth Amendment violation should be made according to the char-
acter of the punishment inflicted rather than the violator's motivation. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
68. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
69. See id. at 345.
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cell, or "double ceiling."'7 The lower court had made extensive find-
ings of fact about the prison space available to accommodate
inmates, both in cells and in recreation areas.7' Despite fact-finding
that was favorable to the prison, the lower court held that double cel-
ling was cruel and unusual punishment to inmates serving long
sentences because of mental and physical injury which resulted from
long-term close confinement with other prisoners.'
In Rhodes, the Court traced its prior applications of the Eighth
Amendment, concluding that the Amendment prohibits the wanton
and unnecessary infliction of pain, including means "'totally without
penological justification.' " Although the standard of "cruel and
unusual" is the same for all cases, the Court recognized that the test
for defining an Eighth Amendment violation is not static and draws
meaning from society's evolving standards of decency." Moreover,
the test does not merely rely on the subjective views of judges, but
should be substantiated by objective factors as well." The Court then
discussed the deliberate indifference standard relied upon in Estelle
and found that the same principles applied in the context of a chal-
lenge to general conditions of confinement as had in the context of
inmates' medical treatment.7' However, the Court's discussion of the
subjective standard ended with its reference to Estelle; it then used
objective factors such as the provision of adequate medical care, sani-
tation, and food to reverse the lower court and hold that conditions in
this case did not violate the Eighth Amendment.' Thus, the Court
70. Id. at 340.
71. See id. at 340-43. Among other facilities, the prison contained gymnasiums,
schoolrooms, workshops, two chapels, a hospital, a barbershop, and a library. See id. at
340. The lower court found that the food, ventilation systems, and temperature in the
prison were adequate. See id. at 342. The prisoners did not produce evidence that an
increase in violence was caused by double celling, but the lower court did find that, be-
cause of overcrowded conditions, there were fewer available jobs for inmates and that the
prison had not increased its staff of social workers and psychologists to account for the
increased number of prisoners. See id. at 342-43.
72. See id. at 343.
73. Id. at 346 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
74. See id.; accord Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,102 (1976).
75. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346. Such objective factors include "'objective indicia'
derived from history, the action of state legislatures, and the sentencing by juries." Id. at
346-47 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-87).
76. See id. at 347; see also supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing the
Estelle Court's application of the deliberate indifference standard to inadequate medical
care cases).
77. See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347-52. The majority focused on the fact that the double
ceiling did not lead to deprivations of medical care, sanitation, or food. See id. at 348;
supra note 71.
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focused on the objective physical conditions in the prison and seemed
to make a decision without examining whether prison officials
showed deliberate indifference to prisoners' needs.
The Supreme Court has also examined cases in which the alleged
constitutional violation was neither a part of the prescribed punish-
ment nor a condition of confinement, but was instead centered
around the actions of prison officials. s In the landmark decision of
Whitley v. Albers,"9 the Court clarified that the subjective component
of Eighth Amendment claims was still an important consideration.'
In Whitley, prison officials shot a prisoner during a riot in which a
guard had been taken hostage by armed prisoners who were not con-
fined within their cells.8' The Court began its analysis by stating that
"[a]n express intent to inflict unnecessary pain is not required" to
make a valid claim under the Eighth Amendment.2 The Court then
stated: "It is obduracy and wantonness ... that characterize the con-
duct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
whether that conduct occurs in connection with establishing condi-
tions of confinement, supplying medical needs, or restoring official
control over a tumultuous cellblock."'' However, the Court noted
that in cases involving prison security measures, the conduct of prison
officials cannot be considered cruel and unusual merely because the
force used appears unreasonable in retrospect; rather, the conduct
78. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (guards beat a prisoner);
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (guards shot a prisoner during a riot). Estelle ad-
dressed the conduct of prison officials that failed to take action to treat a prisoner's
medical condition. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 99-101; supra notes 58-67 and accompanying
text. However, the Court has also examined cases in which prison officials affirmatively
used excessive force against prisoners. See, e.g., Whitley, 475 U.S. at 314-18.
79. 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
80. See id. at 320-21.
81. See id. at 314-17. Several prisoners were found intoxicated in the prison, and
when guards attempted to move them, they resisted, agitating other nearby inmates. See
id. at 314. One inmate assaulted the guards, taking one guard hostage. See id. at 314-15.
Several inmates then "began breaking furniture and milling about." Id. at 315. Although
some inmates were protecting the hostage in a cell, another inmate threatened to kill him
if the guards attempted an assault. See id. Respondent Albers alleged that he was not
involved in the confrontation, but was attempting to move elderly prisoners from their
cells, away from the disturbance. See id. Prison officials decided that intervention was
necessary and armed themselves with guns. See id. at 316. The officials then ran into the
prison, fired a warning shot, and the prison security manager yelled "shoot the bastards."
Id. Respondent Albers fled up some stairs and an officer shot him in the knee, inflicting
severe damage. See id. at 316-17.
82. Id. at 319. Because an express intent to inflict pain is not required, prison officials
can violate the Eighth Amendment merely by showing deliberate indifference to prison-
ers' medical needs. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
83. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
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must be considered in light of the surrounding circumstances at the
time of the alleged violation."
The majority in Whitley reasoned that the deliberate indifference
standard had been appropriate in inadequate medical care cases, be-
cause the state's responsibility for prisoners in this context does not
conflict with other administrative responsibilities, such as safety con-
cerns." However, the Court distinguished such cases from those
involving prison disturbances, because of the threat posed by such
disturbances to the staff, as well as to visitors and other inmates, and
because riots require prison officials to respond quickly under high-
pressure circumstances.' Therefore, the Court articulated a new
standard for excessive force cases:
Where a prison security measure is undertaken to resolve a
disturbance, such as occurred in this case, that indisputably
poses significant risks to the safety of inmates and prison
staff, we think the question whether the measure taken in-
flicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering
ultimately turns on "whether force was applied in a good
faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. '
In order to evaluate this new subjective malicious and sadistic
standard, the Court set forth a four-factor balancing test: (1) the
need to apply force; (2) the relationship between that need and the
amount of force actually used; (3) the threat to staff and other in-
mates' safety as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and (4)
efforts made to temper the severity of officials' forceful response.'
In addition to balancing these four factors, the Court noted that def-
erence must be given to prison officials' judgment concerning
measures necessary to preserve order and discipline and maintain
security within the prison.89 In Whitley, the Court held that prison
84. See id.
85. See id. at 320; see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (applying the
deliberate indifference standard in an inadequate medical care case). The Whitley Court
noted that prison administrators have a duty to provide for the safety of visitors, adminis-
trative personnel, and prison staff, "as well as the 'obligation to take reasonable measures
to guarantee the safety of the inmates themselves.'" Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320 (quoting
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,526-27 (1984)).
86. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320.
87. Id. at 320-21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
88. See id. at 321. These standards were, in part, first set forth by Judge Learned
Hand in Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033. The Whitley Court also noted that the extent of the
injury was a relevant consideration. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321.
89. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)
(challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement in a correctional facil-
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officials merely made an error in using potentially deadly force to
quell the prison disturbance and, therefore, their conduct did not rise
to the level of "malicious and sadistic" in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.' °
In its next major Eighth Amendment case, Wilson v. Seiter," the
Court emphasized that it did not intend the malicious and sadistic
standard to apply to cases involving general prison conditions.2 Wil-
son involved a claim that overall prison conditions constituted cruel
and unusual punishment.93 The Sixth Circuit had applied the mali-
cious and sadistic standard to find that the conditions were not cruel
and unusual.94 The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding that
the malicious and sadistic standard was not appropriate for prison
condition cases, and ordered the lower court to apply the deliberate
indifference standard.95
Whereas in Whitley the Supreme Court focused on the subjective
element of Eighth Amendment claims, the Court revisited the objec-
tive factor in excessive force claims in Hudson v. McMillian.96 In
Hudson, two prison guards beat a prisoner confined in handcuffs and
shacklesY In analyzing the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claim, the
Court affirmed that the subjective malicious and sadistic standard
was appropriate, thus necessitating analysis under the four-factor
Whitley test.98 However, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
ity)). The Court added that "deference extends to a prison security measure taken in
response to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or
preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other breaches of
prison discipline." Id. at 322.
90. Id. at 324, 326. In dissent, Justice Marshall asserted that the existence of a riot
should not lessen the standard imposed on prison officials by the Eighth Amendment. See
id. at 328 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Moreover, the dissent critiqued the application of the
malicious and sadistic standard to a situation which the majority characterized as posing
significant risks, claiming that whether or not there was risk involved was a factual deter-
mination that should have been resolved by the jury. See id. at 329 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
91. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
92. See id. at 302-03.
93. See id. at 296.
94. See id. at 305.
95. See id. at 305-06; ik at 306 (White, J., concurring in judgment) (clarifying the
standard applied by the majority). The Court made clear that deliberate indifference is
"the more lenient ... standard." Id. at 305. Although it is easier to satisfy this lower
standard, the Court concluded that mere negligence, such as that potentially involved in
Wilson, would satisfy neither the deliberate indifference standard nor the malicious and
sadistic standard. See id.
96. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
97. See id. at 4.
98. See id. at 6-7; supra notes 88-89 and accompanying text (describing the four-factor
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had held that the plaintiff must prove significant injury in order to
satisfy the objective element of the claim.Y The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding that "[t]he absence of serious injury is ... relevant to
the ... inquiry, but does not end it.""' The Court observed that the
extent of injury required will vary according to the type of claim, but
that not every touch by a prison guard gives rise to a cause of ac-
tion."' Although the Eighth Amendment excludes de minimis use of
physical force, the Court concluded that Hudson's injuries were not
de minimis, thus implying that if his injuries were not de minimis, the
use of force also was not de minimis.'0 2
Federal courts of appeals have interpreted Supreme Court
precedent on excessive force cases. 3 In Williams v. Burton,' 4 the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed a case factually
similar to Williams v. Benjamin." In Burton, a prisoner who had
been convicted of eighty-four disciplinary violations while in prison,
including assault and inciting riots, cursed at and threatened to kill
several guards during his weekly administrative review.'6 Other in-
mates then joined in the commotion.'0 7 After Williams continued to
threaten, yell at, and spit on officials, officers placed him in four-
point restraints with gauze secured by tape over his mouth.' Wil-
liams was kept in restraints for over twenty-eight hQurs, with short
breaks to use the toilet, eat, and exercise."
Whitley test).
99. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5; Hudson v. McMillian, 929 F.2d 1014, 1015 (5th Cir.
1990) (per curiam), rev'd, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
100. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
101. See id. at 9. The Court explained that in excessive force cases, "[w]hen prison
officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident." Id.
(citation omitted).
102. See id. at 9-10; cf. Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1262 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding
that when a guard struck a prisoner with a set of keys, the injury was de minimis and
therefore not an Eighth Amendment violation).
103. See Davidson v. Flynn, 32 F.3d 27,29-30 (2d Cir. 1994); Norman, 25 F.3d at 1262-
63; LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1993); Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d
1562, 1566-67 (10th Cir. 1991); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991);
Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1268-70 (7th Cir. 1984).
104. 943 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1991).
105. Compare Burton, 943 F.2d at 1574 (describing that the disruptive inmate was
placed in four-point restraints with his mouth taped for over 28 hours), with Williams, 77
F.3d at 760 (stating that Williams was placed in four-point restraints after being maced,
and was confined in that fashion for eight hours).
106. See Burton, 943 F.2d at 1574.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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The court applied the malicious and sadistic test to affirm the
trial court's decision that these actions were justified and did not
violate the Eighth Amendment.11 The court stated that the exigency
of the situation required "a more deferential review" of prison offi-
cials' actions, and that the officers applied gauze and restraints to
keep Williams from inciting a riot, or hurting himself or others."'
The court had more difficulty with the fact that prison officials kept
Williams restrained for over twenty-eight hours, noting that once the
necessity for force ceases, a continued use of harmful force can vio-
late the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.' However, in this
case, the court emphasized granting deference to prison officials, and
ruled that the prisoner's history of disobedience and the potential for
a disturbance justified the prison officials' actions."'
Federal courts of appeals have also established precedent on the
use of mace in calming agitated prisoners. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit addressed this issue in Bailey v. Turner,
1 5
110. See id. at 1576.
111. Id. at 1575.
112. See id. at 1575-76. The Court stated that "[o]nce restraints are initially justified, it
becomes somewhat problematic as to how long they are necessary to meet the ... exigent
circumstances which precipitated their use." Id.
113. See id. at 1576. Many federal courts of appeals have relied upon extensive factual
records from lower courts detailing prisoners' histories of disobedience and violent be-
havior while incarcerated. In LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993), for
example, the trial court developed an extremely detailed factual record that a prisoner
was very dangerous and often attacked other inmates and guards. See id. at 1448-49; see
also id. at 1462 (stating that the court was "most impressed by the extensive prison rec-
ords"); id at 1449 (commenting on the factual record developed by the trial court). The
prisoner alleged that several actions of prison guards violated the Eighth Amendment,
including the use of in-cell restraints. See id. at 1449-50. The court ultimately found that,
though the prison officials had violated the applicable prison regulations, given the dan-
gerous nature of this inmate, the use of restraints would not violate the Eighth
Amendment if in compliance with prison policies. See id. at 1460. Thus, the court re-
manded the case for the lower court to issue an order requiring adherence to the policies.
See id.
Likewise, in Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988), the trial court had
held "extensive evidentiary hearings" revealing the violent conditions in an Illinois peni-
tentiary. Id. at 164; see also Bruscino v. Carlson, 654 F. Supp. 609, 611-12 (S.D. Ill. 1987)
(detailing the district court's findings), affd, 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988). Because of this
violence, which resulted in the deaths of two guards and an inmate, the prison engaged in
a "permanent lockdown," implementing procedures that severely restricted inmates' ac-
tivities within the prison. Bruscino, 854 F.2d at 164. However, because of the detailed
factual record of violence at the prison, the court found that the harsh measures were
reasonable. See id. at 166.
114. See, e.g., Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1984); Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d
963 (4th Cir. 1984); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979); Landman v. Peyton,
370 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966).
115. 736 F.2d 963 (4th Cir. 1984).
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where a prisoner claimed that guards used excessive force by macing
him in his cell.116 The court examined its own precedent and found
that it had previously affirmed the use of tear gas against recalcitrant
prisoners'17 The use of mace against a prisoner was, thus, not per se
unconstitutional, but the Fourth Circuit indicated that courts needed
to look "to the totality of the circumstances, the provocation, the
amount of gas used, and the purposes for which the gas was used" to
assess its constitutionality.'
The use of restraints has also been examined by the federal
courts of appeals. In LeMaire v. Maass,"9 the Ninth Circuit found
that the use of restraints, when used in compliance with prison regu-
lations, does not violate the Eighth Amendment." Likewise, in
Bruscino v. Carlson, the Seventh Circuit found that inmates "tied
spread-eagled on their beds, often for hours at a stretch"' was a rea-
sonable measure because of the history of violence at the prison and
the bad character of the inmates."
Although the Eighth Amendment is traditionally the constitu-
tional provision invoked by prisoners alleging mistreatment, the
Fourteenth Amendment has also played a role in prisoners' excessive
force claims.124 In Whitley, the Court focused on an Eighth Amend-
116. See id. at 965.
117. See id. at 967 (citing Landman v. Peyton, 370 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir. 1966)).
Other federal courts of appeals have also affirmed that mace may be used in reasonable
quantities by prison officials to calm agitated prisoners. See, e.g., Soto, 744 F.2d at 1270;
see also Spain, 600 F.2d at 196 (remanding to lower court to articulate a standard as to the
exact amount of mace a prison can use before it violates the Eighth Amendment); cf.
Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380,383 (4th Cir. 1987) (upholding reasonable use of mace by
police against a violent arrestee).
118. Bailey, 736 F.2d at 969. Other courts have affirmed this view as well. In Soto, for
example, the court found that the use of mace violates the Eighth Amendment when used
in greater quantities than necessary or when used for the sole purpose of punishment or
infliction of pain. See Soto, 744 F.2d at 1270. However, the court stated that the reason-
able use of mace to calm agitated prisoners does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, even if the inmate is confined within his cell. See id.; cf. Justice, 834 F.2d at
383 (holding that macing an intoxicated arrestee who was physically resisting officers was
"a reasonable effort to regain control," despite the fact that the arrestee was handcuffed).
119. 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993).
120. See id. at 1459-60; supra note 113 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's emphasis on
compliance with prison regulations).
121. 854 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1988).
122. Id. at 164.
123. See id. at 166; supra note 113 (discussing the Seventh Circuit's reliance on the
history of violence at the prison).
124. See, e.g., Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986); Mitchell v. Maynard, 80 F.3d
1433 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v. Burton, 77 F.3d 756 (4th Cir. 1996); Branham v.
Meachum, 77 F.3d 626 (2d Cir. 1996); Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 1995);
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ment claim, but it also considered whether prison officials violated
the prisoner's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights."z  The
Court noted that there are both procedural and substantive due proc-
ess claims available to prisoners under the Fourteenth Amendment.'2
In Whitley, the prisoner only asserted a substantive due process
claim.27 The Court held that the Eighth Amendment "serves as the
primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in
cases ... where the ... use of force is challenged as excessive.""
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide any greater pro-
tection than the Eighth Amendment in the context of prisoners'
substantive due process claims.129
The Court discussed a procedural due process claim in Zinermon
v. Burch,'3 where a patient sued a Florida mental institution that had
admitted him as a voluntary patient.131 In Zinermon, the patient al-
leged that the institution should have known he was incompetent to
give informed consent to his admission.32 The plaintiff was confined
to the hospital for five months without a hearing on whether his con-
sent to admission was valid, and argued that a tort remedy following
the deprivation of liberty was never sufficient to cure an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of liberty.'33 The Court explained the distinction
McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944 (6th Cir. 1995); Lunsford v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1574 (7th
Cir. 1994).
125. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 326-27. For the facts of Whitley, see supra note 81 and
accompanying text.
126. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 326.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 327. The Court explained that conduct shocking to the conscience in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment most likely is inconsistent with standards of decency,
which would violate the Eighth Amendment. See id.
129. See id.
130. 494 U.S. 113 (1990). For a discussion of the history of procedural due process
law, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?,
96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1973 (1996).
131. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 114-15.
132. See id Though the Zinermon plaintiff was not confined in a prison, the Fourth
Circuit in Williams relied on Zinermon in its discussion of due process. See Williams, 77
F.3d at 770.
133. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 131. The plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994), which provides a remedy for civil rights violations. This section reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
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between substantive and procedural due process claims.'m A substan-
tive claim encompasses allegedly unconstitutional government
actions, without regard to "'the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.' """3 However, in a procedural due process claim,
the deprivation of life, liberty or property is not itself unconstitu-
tional, but the deprivation of the interest must be in accord with due
process of law.'6 Therefore, in the latter claim, a court must examine
whether there was a pre-deprivation hearing or if an adequate post-
deprivation remedy was provided.137 In Zinermon, the Court exam-
ined the process provided by state statute and tort law, including
"safeguards built into" the applicable statute and remedies, for erro-
neous deprivations of liberty.' Although the Court stated that the
Constitution usually requires some form of hearing before depriva-
tion of liberty or property, it recognized that in some circumstances a
statutory provision for a post-deprivation hearing or a tort remedy
satisfies due process. '  The Court cited examples of these circum-
stances, such as when there is a necessity for quick state action and
the situation makes it impractical to provide pre-deprivation proc-
ess.
1 40
134. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 125.
135. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,331 (1986)).
136. See id. To determine what level of procedural process the Constitution requires,
courts use a balancing test weighing several factors. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 335 (1976). Courts are to consider "the private interest that will be affected by the
official action[,] ... the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest." Id.
137. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127-28. For a procedural due process case holding that
a hearing was necessary before depriving a prisoner of his good-time credits, see Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). Cf Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532,542 (1985) (stating that the Due Process Clause requires a hearing before depri-
vation of an interest); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (finding that mere
conversation with students before their suspension from school was constitutionally in-
adequate); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that welfare benefits
could not be terminated without a hearing).
138. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 126. In Zinermon, the plaintiff did not allege a substantive
violation, so the Court only considered the procedural aspect of his claim. See id. at 126-
27.
139. See id. at 127-28,131-32.
140. See id. at 128; see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 323-26 (1986) (rejecting
the prisoner's procedural due process claim because the volatile situation of a prison riot
necessitated quick action by the guards). The Zinermon Court held that the patient's
complaint stated a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his procedural due proc-
ess rights, but stated no opinion on the ultimate merits of the claim. See Zinermon, 494
U.S. at 139. The Court found that pre-deprivation procedural safeguards might have
prevented deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty, and such procedures would not have been
impossible under these circumstances. See id. at 135-38.
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Six years later, the Court discussed the nature of the Fourteenth
Amendment as it applies to a prisoner's liberty interest in avoiding
administrative segregation in Sandin v. Conner.141 In Sandin, an in-
mate subjected to a rectal search used foul language toward a prison
guard and eleven days later was informed that he had been charged
with a disciplinary infraction.42 The prison adjustment committee
refused to allow the prisoner to present witnesses at the hearing for
his infraction and sentenced him to thirty days in administrative seg-
regation.
143
The Court examined its precedent, noting the "intricate balanc-
ing of prison management concerns with prisoners' liberty in
determining the amount of process due." ' 4 The Court stated that
while it had previously held that states could create liberty interests
for prisoners, the focus of inquiry with alleged violations of such lib-
erty interests had shifted from the nature of the deprivation to the
specific language of particular regulations. 45 This shift had produced
the undesirable result of prisoners combing prison regulations for
mandatory language on which to base entitlement to privileges.'"
Thus, the Sandin Court concluded that states may create liberty in-
terests protected by the Due Process Clause, but that
these interests will be generally limited to freedom from re-
straint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an
unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force, ... nonetheless imposes
141. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995). For analyses of Sandin, see Michelle C. Ciszak, Note,
Sandin v. Conner: Locking Out Prisoners' Due Process Claims, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
1101 (1996); Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. Conner: The Supreme Court's Narrowing
of Prisoners' Due Process and the Missed Opportunity to Discover True Liberty, 81
CORNELL L. REv. 744 (1996); Deborah R. Stagner, Note, Sandin v. Conner, Redefining
State Prisoners' Liberty Interest Due Process Rights, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1761 (1996).
142. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 2297.
145. See id. at 2297, 2299; cf. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding loss of good-time credits was sufficient to find a liberty interest protected by the
Due Process Clause). But see Barichello v. McDonald, 98 F.3d 948, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1996)
(holding that, although an Illinois statute stated that prisoners with mental illnesses
"shall" not be denied mental health or developmental services, the presence of imperative
words did not give the plaintiff a liberty interest in unsupervised access to facility
grounds).
146. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299. The Court felt this was an undesirable result be-
cause, unlike statutes, which are drafted to define rights and remedies of citizens, prison
regulations are drafted to assist prison officials in running prisons. See id. Thus, the crea-
tion of liberty interests from prison regulations gives states a disincentive to codify these
regulations and encourages federal courts to become involved in the management of pris-
ons. See id.
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atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to
the ordinary incidents of prison life."
In this particular case, the Court found that the prescribed punish-
ment effectuated the prison's goals of rehabilitation and
management, and that the prisoner's sentencing to administrative
segregation did not present a significant deprivation of a state-
created liberty interest.'48
Thus, when officials at Lieber Correctional Institution re-
sponded to Sylvester Williams's protest by macing him and chaining
him to his bedframe for eight hours, the Fourth Circuit had ample
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment precedent from which to draw
its analysis, particularly with respect to excessive force claims. The
court began by establishing that Eighth Amendment claims are as-
sessed according to both objective and subjective inquiries.4'
Furthermore, the Williams court recognized that the appropriate
standard to evaluate the subjective component was the malicious and
sadistic standard established in Whitley."
Applying this standard, the Fourth Circuit separated Williams's
claim into three distinct categories for consideration: (1) the initial
application of mace; (2) the initial application of the four-point re-
straints; and (3) the eight-hour confinement without medical care and
without allowing Williams to wash off the mace. 5' The court then
applied the Whitley balancing test to each separate category.' The
147. Id. at 2300 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court pronounced a new standard in
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, to which the federal courts of appeals subse-
quently have conformed. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100 F.3d 640, 641-43 (8th
Cir. 1996) (evaluating a prisoner's § 1983 claim in light of post-Sandin precedent); Duffy
v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1996) (remanding prisoner's § 1983 claim for new
consideration in light of Sandin); Branham v. Meachum, 77 F.3d 626, 630 (2d Cir. 1996)
(allowing prisoner to amend his complaint in light of the new standard of Sandin).
148. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct at 2301.
149. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 761.
150. See id. Therefore, the court did not confuse the "deliberate indifference" and
"malicious and sadistic" standards as the Sixth Circuit did in Wilson v. Seiter, 893 F.2d
861, 867 (6th Cir. 1990), judgment vacated by 501 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1991). For a discus-
sion of Wilson, see supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
151. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 762-64.
152. See id. This is a surprising approach, given the Supreme Court's reluctance in
Eighth Amendment claims to state that one particular practice, standing alone, violates
the Constitution. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351 (1981). However, this
method of splitting claims up for analysis is not totally unprecedented. The Eleventh
Circuit used this technique in Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (11th Cir. 1991),
separately analyzing the initial use of restraints, the initial use of a gag, and the fact that
prison officials left the plaintiff restrained for twenty-eight hours. See id. at 1575; see also
supra notes 104-13 (discussing Burton).
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Supreme Court, however, has cautioned against deciding that a par-
ticular practice violates the Eighth Amendment, because, unless later
overruled by the Court, a "'decision that a given punishment is im-
permissible under the Eighth Amendment cannot be reversed short
of a constitutional amendment.' ,,153 Thus, although the Williams
court initially examined the officials' conduct category-by-category,
the court did not find a potential constitutional violation until it sub-
sequently considered the entire pattern of behavior in the
aggregate."5
The constitutionality of the application of mace is well-
established by precedent. Federal courts of appeals, including the
Fourth Circuit, have held that the use of mace is not per se unconsti-
tutional. 5' In Bailey,5' the Fourth Circuit held that whether or not
the use of mace against a prisoner in his cell violated the Eighth
Amendment depends upon an examination of the totality of the cir-
cumstances, including the provocation, the quantity of mace used,
and the purposes for which it was used. 57 Therefore, in Williams, the
court evaluated the circumstances surrounding the initial application
of mace under the four-factor Whitley test, first considering the need
for application of force.158 Because Williams threw water at the
guards and refused to obey commands to desist, the court found that
the use of some force was justifiable. 59 The court also quickly dis-
posed of the third Whitley factor-the threat reasonably perceived by
prison officials."W Here, the court reasoned that the guards believed
Williams was throwing "foul-smelling liquids" at them and noted that
inmates often throw excretory waste at their jailers; thus, the court
found that the guards could have reasonably believed that Williams
153. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 351 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)).
Because of the Supreme Court's reluctance to consider one particular practice unconstitu-
tional, it is surprising that the Fourth Circuit considered the initial use of mace and the
initial use of restraints separately as potential Eighth Amendment violations, rather than
applying the Whitley balancing test to the entire incident.
154. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 762-65.
155. See, e.g., Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1266, 1271 (7th Cir. 1984); Bailey v.
Turner, 736 F.2d 963, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1984); Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 196 (9th
Cir. 1979); supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text.
156. Bailey v. Turner, 736 F.2d 964 (4th Cir. 1984). For a summary of Bailey, see su-
pra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
157. See Bailey, 736 F.2d at 969; supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (describing
the Bailey court's holding that the use of mace was not per se unconstitutional).
158. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 762. See supra text accompanying notes 88-89 for the
four-factor Whitley test.
159. See Williams, 77F.3d at 762.
160. See id. at 763.
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was posing a threat.16
The court then analyzed the fourth Whitley factor-the efforts
made to temper the severity of the response. The court observed
that at least one federal court of appeals had noted that the applica-
tion of mace can be more humane than flesh-to-flesh confrontation,
and that the pain from mace can be immediately alleviated by wash-
ing it off.'" Thus, the initial use of mace indicated that officials
attempted to temper their response."6
Finally, the court stated that it would evaluate the second
Whitley factor, the relationship between the need for force and the
force used, by looking to the totality of the circumstances in which
the mace was applied.'65 Although the court noted that the use of
mace is reasonable in limited quantities to control recalcitrant in-
mates, it did not analyze the amount of mace used to determine if its
use in this case was reasonable." Thus, it seems that the court based
its decision to uphold the constitutionality of the use of mace on the
first, third and fourth Whitley factors.
In considering the initial application of mace, the Fourth Circuit,
by not considering the quantity of mace used, did not follow the lead
of other federal courts of appeals, such as the Ninth Circuit in Spain
v. Procunier.67 In Spain, the court expressed extreme concern with
prison officials' initial decision to use mace, noting that one inmate
had died from tear gas inhalation in the same prison.'6 Although the
Spain court acknowledged that use of mace in small amounts may be
justified, it added that "[w]e think it makes little sense to say that use
of tear gas can never be a violation of the eighth amendment."'69
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that the constitutionality of
161. Id.; see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1448-49 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing a
prisoner's repeated confinement to administrative segregation after his attack on inmates
and guards using excretory waste); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574 (11th Cir.
1991) (finding that restraint of a prisoner was warranted after he threw bodily fluids from
his cell).
162. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
163. See id.; Soto v. Dickey, 744 F.2d 1260, 1262 (7th Cir. 1984).
164. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
165. See id.
166. See id. The court discussed the amount of mace used later in its opinion, in con-
nection with its consideration of Williams's eight-hour confinement. See infra text
accompanying notes 182-84. However, although the court stated that mace could be
"used in small quantities" to control prisoners, it did not actually consider the quantity of
mace used on Williams. Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
167. 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
16& See id. at 194.
169. Id. at 196 (emphasis added).
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the initial decision to use mace turned upon the quantity used, and
directed the lower court to articulate a standard concerning dosage
levels that would be appropriate for recalcitrant inmates." However,
the Williams court did not consider the relevance of the exact amount
of mace used until it reviewed the third component of Williams's
claim-the length of his restraint without medical attention.
The Williams court next considered whether the initial use of re-
straints violated the Eighth Amendment.' Acknowledging that the
need for restraints was not as evident as the need for mace, the court
nonetheless did not find a constitutional violation.'" The court stated
that although it appeared that the guards could not have reasonably
perceived that Williams was still a threat, Whitley established that the
focus of inquiry is not the necessity of the guards' actions, but
whether there was ample evidence that the guards "wantonly pun-
ished Williams."' Therefore, the court reasoned, because the
disturbance had only begun minutes before and Williams was still
screaming, the court could not conclude that there was no need for
force or that the guards did not reasonably perceive a threat, thus
satisfying the first and third Whitley factors.' The court then quickly
disposed of the second and fourth Whitley factors, by reasoning that
the use of restraints is not an "uncommon 'next' step if verbal com-
mands, show of force, and mace, are ineffective in controlling
prisoners."'75
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning is slightly puzzling. The court ini-
tially stated that the guards' actions did not seem necessary, but then
noted that necessity is not the focus of the inquiry.76 However, after
evaluating the situation, the court concluded that it could not defini-
tively say there was no "need" for force, thus evaluating a factor that
it claimed was not the focus.'" Furthermore, although Whitley stated
that the infliction of pain is not necessarily cruel and unusual merely
170. See id. The Ninth Circuit also instructed the district court to articulate a standard
for "manner of use." Id.
171. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
172. See id. at 764.
173. Id. at 763-64. The court did not discuss whether taking Williams's mattress off of
the bed before chaining him to the metal frame was an indication of wanton punishment.
174. See id. at 764. For a discussion of the logical inconsistency in the court's reason-
ing, see infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
175. Williams, 77 F.3d at 764 (citation omitted).
176. See id. at 763. However, the "need for application of force" is the first Whitley
factor. Id. at 762.
177. See id. at 764.
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because the force seemed unreasonable in retrospect,7 ' the Fourth
Circuit did not examine the extreme factual differences between
Whitley and Williams. In Whitley, several armed inmates had taken a
guard hostage, and guards had to lead an assault with guns.' In Wil-
liams, the prisoner was confined safely in a cell and was begging for a
shower because he had been maced."' Thus, while in a true emer-
gency situation such as in Whitley, courts should be more willing to
excuse an amount of force that appears excessive in hindsight, the
same is not necessarily true in the Williams situation. Finally, the
court did not explain why a "next step" was needed to control Wil-
liams, since the defendants acknowledged that upon being maced all
of the disruptive inmates ceased their actions."'
The bulk of the court's opinion dealt with the constitutional im-
plications of macing Williams, restraining him, and then leaving him
without adequate medical care for eight hours.'" The court noted
that defendants did not counter Williams's claim that he was
screaming in pain and begging for a shower." Furthermore, 5.5
grams of mace was sprayed into the block of cells and one medical
test pronounced six grams to be a lethal dose.'" Thus, the court re-
versed the lower court's grant of summary judgment, concluding that
to do otherwise "would create a harmful precedent" that would allow
prison guards to constitutionally mace and restrain inmates for ex-
tended periods of time without medical attention.'
The court emphasized that in previous cases where actions taken
to quell prison disturbances have been found constitutional, there
was evidence that the prison was following regulations with regard to
the use of mace and four-point restraints."" In Williams, however, it
178. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,319 (1986).
179. See iii at 314-16; supra note 81 and accompanying text.
180. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 759-60; supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
181. Williams, 77 F.3d at 763.
182. See id. at 764.
183. See id.
184. See id. Admittedly, the fact that 5.5 grams of mace was sprayed into the cells
does not necessarily indicate that individual inmates received a dose of 5.5 grams.
185. Id. at 765. The court added that while the guards' actions ultimately may not be
found to have violated the Constitution, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, indicated that there may have been a "'wanton infliction of pain.'" Id.
(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,322 (1986)).
186. See id. at 767-68; see also LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1459-60 (9th Cir. 1993)
(finding that the use of restraints is constitutional when used in compliance with prison
regulations); cf Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that
adequate precautions were taken to ensure the prisoner's well-being through "constant
monitoring and examinations by medical personnel").
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was not at all clear that prison officials followed their own regula-
tions," which provide that restraints will " '[u]nder no circumstances
... be applied ... for punishment.' ,,s Although the guards asserted
that Williams's confinement was necessary to protect them from dan-
ger, Williams pointed to a contradictory prison memorandum stating
that whenever an inmate throws a substance at an officer, the inmate
must be restrained in four-point restraints.' 9 Furthermore, the regu-
lations provided for monitoring and medical attention, which
Williams claimed were not given.' Thus, the officials' claim that
they adhered to the policy "undermine[d] their position that sum-
mary judgment was proper.' 9.
Additionally, the court emphasized that the officers in Williams
relied on three cases which, when analyzed carefully, seemed counter
to their argument and established that summary judgment was inap-
propriate." In Bruscino, the Seventh Circuit upheld the extreme use
of force because of documented violence in the prison and the violent
tendencies of the prisoners involved. Likewise, in Burton, the
Eleventh Circuit allowed the prison to gag a prisoner and restrain
him for over twenty-eight hours, in part, because the prisoner had
been convicted of eighty-four charges of violating prison regulations,
seventy-five of which were for violent assaults and threats.' In Le-
Maire, the Ninth Circuit found a prison's use of restraints, quiet cells,
and removal of a prisoner's clothing constitutional in light of the ex-
tremely violent record of a particular prisoner.95 Thus, all three cases
upheld the use of force against inmates, but did so largely in reliance
on detailed factual records of prior disruptive behavior. In Williams,
however, the district court did not review any factual history regard-
ing Williams or the prison in which he was confined to determine the
187. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 765-66.
188. Id. at 766 (quoting the SCDC Policy, supra note 24).
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 767.
193. See Bruscino v. Carlson, 854 F.2d 162, 166 (7th Cir. 1988); supra notes 113, 121-23
and accompanying text (indicating that the restraint of inmates was reasonable because of
the prisoners' character and particularly violent prison conditions).
194. See Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574, 1576 (11th Cir. 1991); supra text
accompanying note 106 (detailing the prisoner's disciplinary record, which included
threatening to kill guards during a weekly review).
195. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1447-48, 1462 (9th Cir. 1993); supra note 113
and accompanying text (describing prisoner's violent propensities to attack other prison-
ers and guards).
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necessity of extra precautionary measures.9 '
Although the Fourth Circuit followed Supreme Court precedent
with regard to the malicious and sadistic standard for excessive force
claims,1" it arguably could have ruled differently in Williams and still
remained consistent with that precedent. The Supreme Court and
the lower courts have not applied bifurcated standards to Eighth
Amendment claims, but it is clear that the standard applicable to al-
legations of inadequate medical care is deliberate indifference."9'
Although Williams did not separate his claim into components, the
court separated it into three categories-the initial use of mace, the
four-point restraints, and the length of restraint without medical
care-and applied the malicious and sadistic standard to each cate-
gory.'99 While the application of mace and the use of restraints
against unruly inmates is readily classified as an allegation of exces-
sive force by prison officials, ° the third component of the claim
could arguably be viewed as an allegation of inadequate medical care,
especially since the court emphasized the lack of monitoring during
Williams's confinement and the fact that he was forced to inhale
mace fumes for eight hours."0' Thus, if the court had shown more
sympathy to Williams's predicament, it could have applied the delib-
erate indifference standard to the portion of Williams's claim
concerning his eight-hour confinement by treating it as a challenge to
the provision of medical care.
196. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 768.
197. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312,320-21 (1986).
198. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
199. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 761. The court stated that its inquiry was whether the
evidence supported a" 'reliable inference of wantonness in the infliction of pain.'" Id. at
765 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 322). This is a general standard to be used whenever a
potential Eighth Amendment violation occurs, and should "be applied with due regard for
differences in the kind of conduct against which an Eighth Amendment objection is
lodged." Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. Thus, the "deliberate indifference" standard and the
"malicious and sadistic" standard are two ways of determining whether this "wantonness"
exists. Id. at 320-21.
200. Many cases have addressed the use of mace, four-point restraints, and other
measures undertaken to maintain prison security, consistently evaluating these claims
under the malicious and sadistic standard. See, e.g., Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21
(employing the malicious and sadistic standard when prison security measures were taken
to control a prison disturbance); LeMaire, 12 F.3d at 1452-53, 1459-60 (finding that the
malicious and sadistic standard is the appropriate one with which to analyze sanctions
used in exigent circumstances against a dangerous inmate, including the use of four-point
restraints); Williams v. Burton, 943 F.2d 1572, 1574-75 (11th Cir. 1991) (using the mali-
cious and sadistic standard to evaluate a prisoner's claim that he was kept in restraints for
28 hours).
201. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 765.
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A questionable aspect of the Fourth Circuit's decision is its quick
dismissal of Williams's procedural due process claim.2 When pris-
oners file complaints pro se, courts liberally construe them and hold
them to "'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers.' "2" The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Williams's
claims of due process violations were "persuasive and forceful," be-
cause the restraints were a significant and atypical disruption in his
environment and the SCDC Policy created an expectation that in-
mates would not be restrained absent certain predicates."'
Nevertheless, the court dismissed his claims because he did not allege
the precise procedural protections required.25 Citing Zinermon, 26 the
court stated that when the provision of pre-deprivation procedures is
impossible because of an emergency situation, a court may conclude
that post-deprivation state remedies are adequate. 7 However, de-
spite the court's acknowledgment of the strength of Williams's
argument, the court did not liberally construe Williams's complaint
to find allegations of inadequate post-deprivation procedures, thus
precluding him from amending his complaint upon remand." s The
court did not even mention the traditional liberal reading of pro se
complaints.
Although stating the proper rule, the court's dismissal of Wil-
liams's substantive due process claim is equally perplexing. Whitley
stated unequivocally that the Eighth Amendment is the source of
substantive protection to prisoners, and the Fourteenth Amendment
provides no greater protection.' Therefore, in Whitley, the Court
dismissed the prisoner's due process claim because it found no Eighth
Amendment violation."' In Williams, however, the court remanded
the case for the specific purpose of developing a factual record to de-
termine whether there was an Eighth Amendment violation. 1 Thus,
it seems that the Fourth Circuit could not necessarily determine that
a substantive Fourteenth Amendment violation did not occur when it
202. See id. at 768-70.
203. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519,520-21 (1972)).
204. Williams, 77 F.3d at 769.
205. See id.
206. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128 (1990); see also supra notes 130-40 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and holding of Zinermon).
207. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 770.
208. See id.
209. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986); supra notes 128-29 and accompa-
nying text.
210. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327.
211. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 768,770.
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had not yet been determined that an Eighth Amendment violation
did not occur. Therefore, although the Fourth Circuit did not stray
from the rules pronounced by the Supreme Court, its application of
some of those rules may stray from the spirit of Supreme Court
precedent.
There are also certain policy implications from the Fourth Cir-
cuit's decision that it may not have foreseen. For example, the
court's determination that the initial application of mace is not per se
unconstitutional, regardless of the quantity used,2 may have unfor-
tunate ramifications. Conceivably, a lethal dosage of mace could be
sprayed on a recalcitrant inmate as long as officials claim they would
have allowed him to wash it off later. Furthermore, the court con-
doned the use of full-body restraints when a "next step" is needed to
quell a prison disruption.' However, the circumstances in which a
"next step" can be justified seem unclear. The Williams court stated
that Whitley established that "the necessity of the guards' actions is
not the proper focus of inquiry., 21 4 Whitley does state that the inflic-
tion of pain during a prison disturbance is not a constitutional
violation simply because it appears in retrospect that it was unneces-
sary,215 but Whitley also expressly states that the need for force is an
important consideration in evaluating subjective intent.21 Therefore,
it seems that a more careful analysis of the need for restraints should
be imposed, rather than a blanket declaration that the use of re-
straints did not "support[] the inference that the guards wantonly
punished Williams., 2
17
While the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied the
appropriate rules in Williams, it could have taken a different ap-
proach to the case without violating Supreme Court precedent.
While the facts in Williams may be sufficiently egregious to have ef-
fectively compelled the court to find an Eighth Amendment
violation, the court's reasoning certainly was not a breakthrough for
prisoner's rights.2 " The court rejected an opportunity to more rigor-
212. See icL at 763; supra notes 35, 182-85 and accompanying text.
213. See Williams, 77 F.3d at 764; supra notes 36, 175 and accompanying text.
214. Williams, 77 F.3d at 763; see also supra note 173 and accompanying text (stating
the Whitley Court's conclusion that the focus of the inquiry should be on whether the
guards punished Williams).
215. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
216. See id. at 320-21.
217. Williams, 77 F.3d at 764.
218. Some journals have exposed particularly harsh conditions in some of the nation's
prisons. See, e.g., Sally Mann Romano, Comment, If the Shu Fits: Cruel and Unusual
Punishment at California's Pelican Bay State Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1089-91 (1996);
Peter Morrison, The New Chain Gang: States' New 'Get-Tough' Prison Policies Are
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ousl define the standard for the use of mace in controlled quanti-
ties, 9 and effectively left the use of full restraints to the complete
discretion of prison officials.' In addition, it applied the higher ex-
cessive force standard to all aspects of Williams's claim, even though
a portion of his claim could arguably be considered as an allegation
of inadequate medical care." Although Williams did not bifurcate
his claim into excessive force and inadequate medical care compo-
nents, courts are expected to read pro se complaints liberally, a rule
that the court did not follow here. " -
In Spain, the Ninth Circuit declared: "Whatever rights one
may lose at the prison gates, the full protections of the eighth
amendment most certainly remain in force." 4 While a first reading
of Williams may seem to support this proposition, a closer reading
leaves many questions unanswered regarding how far prison officials
may go without violating prisoners' constitutional rights. Perhaps on
remand the court will find Williams to be a dangerous inmate whose
prior conduct warranted this harsh treatment. If not, perhaps when
Sylvester Williams walked through the front gates of Lieber Correc-
tional Institution, he indeed checked his constitutional rights at the
door.
TARYN S. GORDON
Gaining Support From Politicians and the Courts, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1995, at Al. How-
ever, politicians have been espousing the philosophy that "[p]risons should be cheap and
tough." Id. Moreover, some commentators feel the Supreme Court has sent the message
to lower courts not to micro-manage prisons, but to defer to prison officials. See id. Civil
rights groups are attempting to combat this trend, claiming that the harshness of prisons
"are creating a dangerous and frightening atmosphere counterproductive to rehabilita-
tion-and to prison security." Id.
219. See supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding that
restraints were appropriate despite the defendants' acknowledgment that the inmates
calmed after being maced).
221. See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of bi-
furcating the claim into an excessive force claim and an inadequate medical care claim).
222. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text (explaining courts' traditional view
of holding pro se complaints to less stringent standards than other complaints and the
Williams court's reluctance to do so).
223. Spain v. Procunier, 600 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1979).
224. Id. at 193-94 (citation omitted).
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